A Softer Formalism


Peter L. Strauss

Responding to John F. Manning, Separation of Powers as Ordinary Interpretation, 124 Harv. L. Rev. 1939 (2011)

In this response to Professor John Manning’s Separation of Powers as Ordinary Interpretation, Professor Peter Strauss argues for a more nuanced understanding of functionalism and textualism, the schools that serve as the poles of Professor Manning’s middle-ground approach. Professor Strauss also suggests that Professor Manning could go farther in observing the influence that the details of the Constitution’s text might have on interpretations of the President’s Article II authority.

124 Harv. L. Rev. F. 55 (2011) | DOWNLOAD PDF

Online Forum

Responding to Rebecca Tushnet, Worth a Thousand Words: The Images of Copyright, 125 Harv. L. Rev. 683 (2012)

More Than a Thousand Words in Response to Rebecca Tushnet

Christina Spiesel



Responding to Orin S. Kerr, An Equilibrium-Adjustment Theory of the Fourth Amendment, 125 Harv. L. Rev. 476 (2011)

An Original Take on Originalism

Christopher Slobogin


Responding to Dan M. Kahan, Neutral Principles, Motivated Cognition, and Some Problems for Constitutional Law, 125 Harv. L. Rev. 1 (2011)

Democracy’s Distrust: Contested Values and the Decline of Expertise

Suzanna Sherry

“I Couldn’t See It Until I Believed It”: Some Notes on Motivated Reasoning in Constitutional Adjudication

Mark Tushnet


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