Trespass-Copyright Parallels and the Harm-Benefit Distinction

Wendy J. Gordon

Responding to Shyamkrishna Balganesh, Foreseeability and Copyright Incentives, 122 Harv. L. Rev. 1569 (2009)

Currently, the elements of a plaintiff’s cause of action for copyright largely follow the tort of trespass to land in that volitional entry (for land) or volitional copying (for copyright) gives rise to liability regardless of proof of harm and without any need for the plaintiff to prove the defendant acted unreasonably. Many scholars have criticized copyright law for following the strict liability model of real property trespass, and have suggested alternatives that would more resemble conditional causes of action such as unfair competition, nuisance, or negligence. In Foreseeability and Copyright Incentives, Professor Shyamkrishna Balganesh argues that copyright plaintiffs should be required to prove foreseeability in order to make out a copyright claim. In this response, Professor Wendy Gordon suggests some new reasons why the tort of copyright infringement should be reformulated to abandon the trespass-to-land model, and explores some of the merits and shortcomings of Balganesh’s own version of the revised tort.

122 Harv. L. Rev. F. 62 (2009) | DOWNLOAD PDF

Should Antitrust Condemn Tying Arrangements that Increase Price Without Restraining Competition?

Steven Semeraro :: In his article Tying, Bundled Discounts, and the Death of the Single Monopoly Profit Theory, Professor Einer Elhauge attempted to demonstrate that tying, the practice whereby a firm conditions the sale of one product on the customer’s agreement to purchase another, always harms consumers. He determined that antitrust law should prohibit tying even when that tying did not restrain competition in the tied product’s market. In this response, Professor Steven Semeraro argues that this form of tying actually benefits consumers in the long term. READ MORE

Disappearing Neighbors

David D. Troutt :: In his article Mobile Capital, Local Economic Regulation, and the Democratic City, Professor Richard C. Schragger explored the consequences of local governments’ attempts to entice — and then exploit — mobile capital. He concluded that cities possess, but must not abuse, the power to assert democratic control over capital flow. In this response, Professor David D. Troutt argues that current foreclosure crisis demonstrates the weakness of cities in relation to mobile capital. READ MORE

Freeing Employee Choice: The Case For Secrecy in Union Organizing and Voting

Cynthia Estlund :: In his article Enabling Employee Choice, Professor Benjamin Sachs provided a nuanced analysis of what is wrong both with current law and with the leading reform proposal. In this response, Professor Cynthia Estlund argues that Professor Sachs’s reform proposal is likely to set the terms for future scholarly analysis and for serious public debate over the role of law in union organizing regardless of the fate of labor law reform in the current Congress. READ MORE

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