Optimal Timing of Legal Intervention: The Role of Timing Rules


Barbara Luppi & Francesco Parisi

Responding to Jacob E. Gersen and Eric A. Posner, Timing Rules and Legal Institutions, 121 Harv. L. Rev. 543 (2007)

In Timing Rules and Legal Institutions, Professors Jacob E. Gersen and Eric A. Posner investigated the optimal timing of legislative action and the role of timing rules in constraining legislative action. That article provides a comprehensive and coherent discussion of the various constitutional, economic, practical, and theoretical issues involved in timing rules, while also developing a robust normative framework for assessing the optimal timing of legislation. This response expands on the points Gersen and Posner discussed, noting potential missed opportunities and formulating suggestions for future extensions. It proposes three additional timing rules in addition to the four identified by Gersen and Posner and discusses the implications of each from the perspective of option value. This response also considers the effects of the dynamic cost structure of lawmaking and argues that optimal timing should be considered in conjunction with optimal specificity of legislation.



121 Harv. L. Rev. F. 18 (2009) | DOWNLOAD PDF

Comments (0)


We encourage respectful, thoughtful commentary. All comments will be reviewed before posting.
Name
E-mail (Will not appear online)
Homepage
Subject
Comment
To prevent automated Bots form spamming, please enter the text you see in the image below in the appropriate input box. Your comment will only be submitted if the strings match. Please ensure that your browser supports and accepts cookies, or your comment cannot be verified correctly.
»
Online Forum


Responding to Orin S. Kerr, An Equilibrium-Adjustment Theory of the Fourth Amendment, 125 Harv. L. Rev. 476 (2011)

An Original Take on Originalism

Christopher Slobogin


Responding to Dan M. Kahan, Neutral Principles, Motivated Cognition, and Some Problems for Constitutional Law, 125 Harv. L. Rev. 1 (2011)

Democracy’s Distrust: Contested Values and the Decline of Expertise

Suzanna Sherry

“I Couldn’t See It Until I Believed It”: Some Notes on Motivated Reasoning in Constitutional Adjudication

Mark Tushnet


Responding to John F. Manning, Separation of Powers as Ordinary Interpretation, 124 Harv. L. Rev. 1939 (2011)

A Softer Formalism

Peter L. Strauss

Optimal Specificity in the Law of Separation of Powers: The Numerous Clauses Principle

Gary Lawson


Responding to Trevor W. Morrison, Constitutional Alarmism, 124 Harv. L. Rev. 1688 (2011)

Lost Inside the Beltway

Bruce Ackerman

Libya, “Hostilities,” the Office of Legal Counsel, and the Process of Executive Branch Legal Interpretation

Trevor W. Morrison


FORUM ARCHIVE


Harvard Law Review
Gannett House
1511 Massachusetts Ave
Cambridge, MA 02138

Editorial Office:
617-495-7889
617-496-5053 (fax)

Business Office:
617-495-4650
617-495-2748 (fax)