Cultural Evaluations of Risk: "Values" or "Blunders"?

Dan M. Kahan & Paul Slovic

Responding to Cass R. Sunstein, Misfearing: A Reply, 119 Harv. L. Rev. 1110 (2006)

What are the respective contributions of culture and rationality to risk perception? Do disagreements between lay persons and experts (and among members of both groups) originate in conflicting values, differing abilities to comprehend technical information, or both? If conflicting values do play a role, should the law be responsive to popular perceptions of risk even when expert regulators believe that popular beliefs are wrong? These are the central questions in the debate between Professor Sunstein and us. We take the position that cultural worldviews pervade popular (not to mention expert) risk assessments and that a genuine commitment to democracy forbids simply dismissing such perceptions as products of “bounded rationality.” Sunstein disagrees. The critical import of Sunstein’s arguments notwithstanding, we are grateful for his thoughtful reply to our review essay. We now respond to two of Sunstein’s criticisms, one methodological and the other substantive.

119 Harv. L. Rev. F. 166 (2006) | DOWNLOAD PDF

Should Antitrust Condemn Tying Arrangements that Increase Price Without Restraining Competition?

Steven Semeraro :: In his article Tying, Bundled Discounts, and the Death of the Single Monopoly Profit Theory, Professor Einer Elhauge attempted to demonstrate that tying, the practice whereby a firm conditions the sale of one product on the customer’s agreement to purchase another, always harms consumers. He determined that antitrust law should prohibit tying even when that tying did not restrain competition in the tied product’s market. In this response, Professor Steven Semeraro argues that this form of tying actually benefits consumers in the long term. READ MORE

Disappearing Neighbors

David D. Troutt :: In his article Mobile Capital, Local Economic Regulation, and the Democratic City, Professor Richard C. Schragger explored the consequences of local governments’ attempts to entice — and then exploit — mobile capital. He concluded that cities possess, but must not abuse, the power to assert democratic control over capital flow. In this response, Professor David D. Troutt argues that current foreclosure crisis demonstrates the weakness of cities in relation to mobile capital. READ MORE

Freeing Employee Choice: The Case For Secrecy in Union Organizing and Voting

Cynthia Estlund :: In his article Enabling Employee Choice, Professor Benjamin Sachs provided a nuanced analysis of what is wrong both with current law and with the leading reform proposal. In this response, Professor Cynthia Estlund argues that Professor Sachs’s reform proposal is likely to set the terms for future scholarly analysis and for serious public debate over the role of law in union organizing regardless of the fate of labor law reform in the current Congress. READ MORE

FORUM ARCHIVE

RSS FEED

Harvard Law Review
Gannett House
1511 Massachusetts Ave
Cambridge, MA 02138

Editorial Office:
617-495-7889
617-496-5053 (fax)

Business Office:
617-495-4650
617-495-2748 (fax)